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LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC PROGRAM
DAVID B. JOHNSON*

As in other areas of the United States .program, the most pervasive
influence in labor relations in atomic energy has been the federal
government. The non-government sector is expanding rapidly in
terms of the number of companies launching atomic energy operations, but this expansion is still in the exploratory and research and
development stage. During this period of development in the private
sector of the industry employers have relatively heavy need for engineering and technical skills and less for manual workers who are more
susceptible to union organization. Although some problems for management and labor in the private sector of the program are emerging,
particularly in the area of radiation hazard to workers, there has been
little collective bargaining experience there. Thus the governmentadministered portion of the program continues to hold the center of
interest for labor-management relations.
In many respects the government sector of the atomic program is
characterized by the same basic conditions which were inherited from
the Manhattan Engineer District. And the Atomic Energy Commission's labor relations policies, which received their basic formulation
early in the existence of the Commission, have served satisfactorily
and undergone little basic change. The primary problems of labormanagement relations in the program have stemmed from the use of
contractors in construction and operations and the consequent need
(1) to regulate labor expenditures under cost type contracts, (2) to
retain some government control to prevent work stoppages from interrupting continuity of production and research operations, and (3)
to retain authority for the AEC to make and administer security rules,
thereby excluding such matters from collective bargaining. The
existence of these special conditions has distinguished atomic energy
labor-management relations from normal processes in other industries,
and experience under them may have significance for future law and
administrative process.
All these special conditions have resulted from the overbearing
sense of urgency which has characterized the program since its beginning. Although some of the stringent conditions imposed during
World War II (such as the prohibition of union organization prior
to 1946) were removed after the war, much of the emergency nature
of the program has been retained to the present time despite many
efforts to bring about more normal conditions to fit generally accepted preconceptions about desirable procedures in labor-manage* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin.
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ment relationships. Outsiders who have attempted to adapt these
relations to conventional or normal labor-management procedures
have come away impressed with the way in which these considerations
are subordinated to the larger goals of the program pursuant to the
Commission's view of its responsibility for national security. Thus
the atomic energy labor management policy represents a compromise
between what may be desirable for good labor relations and what is
essential in the eyes of the Commission to perform its mission.
Production, research and development, construction of new plants,
and maintenance and service functions are all performed under the
terms of contracts with the AEC. Production and research and development contractors are mostly large private corporations. All construction is performed by private contractors. AEC operations are
often termed GOPO, (government-owned, privately operated), although government-owned, contractor-operated is more accurate
terminology since some contractors are units of state and local government, not private employers. The contractors currently employ approximately 113,000, while the AEC has about 6,800 employees.1
Employers in the program have been recruited from a wide range of
industries. This factor, together with the great variation in the kinds
of work they perform, points up the difficulty of trying to treat atomic
energy as an "industry." The big contractors have their origins and
perform their principal activities in the chemical, electrical equipment,
electronic, petroleum, primary metals, aviation and rubber industries,
although some of the largest are academic institutions. Operations
consist of such diverse functions as ore treatment and refinement,
metal fabrication, gaseous diffusion operations, operation of atomic
reactors and related chemical processing, fabrication of weapons and
all the hardware which goes with them, diverse basic and applied
research, design and development of reactors and related equipment
for propulsion of ships and airplanes and for production of commercial
electric power, manufacture and use of isotopes in industry, medicine,
agriculture, as well as performance of a variety of other associated
functions. Together these operations are less an industry than a group
of diverse activities related to each other by a common means of support, the AEC.
Both the Commission and the Manhattan District before it have
proceeded in the belief that the magnitude of individual operations, as
well as the novelty and uncertainty of the work to be done, make it
unlikely that industrial firms could be induced to undertake these
projects under fixed price contracts. 2 Therefore the greatest part of
the work performed by contractors is paid for at actual cost. In
1. 24 AEC SsAuANN. REP. 209-10 (1958).
2. 9 AEC SEMiANN. REP. 48-49 (1951).

1958]

LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC PROGRAM

163

administering contracts of this kind the government must assure itself
a fair return for money spent. This means retaining the right in some
form to make a judgment about proposed rates of labor expenditure
before approving payment to the contractor. This arises from the
AEC's double obligation to avoid substandard labor conditions on its
project and to assure itself that the contractor does not waste the
taxpayers' money. While the former possibility seems remote, given
the existence of unions of employees, the latter would appear to be a
real threat under a cost type contract. While there is no incentive to
be extravagant, as there would be under a cost-plus-percentage-ofcost contract, there is also no economy motivation resulting from
the prospect of an increased money return.
In cases where contractor employees are organized, the exercise of
government authority to review the rate of labor expenditures raise
the possibility of disapproval of negotiated settlements. Should this
happen, union representatives may reasonably raise the question of
who are the real employers, the contractors or the government. And
the very existence of this government authority under the contract,
coupled with its interest in economy, is apt to suggest strongly to
unions that the AEC is not a neutral third party in the contractorunion relationship. Thus, the contractor system raises this dilemma
for the AEC: How can it discharge its fiscal responsibility in reviewing
reimbursable costs while remaining free from any seeming alliance
with its contractors in their bargaining? In the absence of such a close
relationship, how can a contractor have any confidence that the AEC
will approve the terms of a negotiated settlement? Conversely, are
there circumstances where a union should have an effective appeal
to the AEC in an attempt to gain more than the contractor's final
offer?
The Commission has, therefore, had the problem of how much
control to exercise in the collective bargaining relationship. Such control has had to be somewhere between the extremes of a laissez
faire policy under which a weak contractor might yield to all demands
of a union in order to buy labor peace with government funds, and
a policy of tight control which would eliminate exercise of contractor
judgment and initiative, the raison d'etre of the contractor system.
In steering between these extremes the AEC has been aided less
perhaps by the wisdom of its policies than by the proclivity of its
contractor managements, at least when facing a union across the
bargaining table, to act as though they were spending their own
money. Since most large contracts are let to firms with national
reputations, the protection of that reputation is one insurance against
a wasteful operation. Also, such contractors have been eager to apply
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the same policies and procedures which have contributed to the
success of their other operations.
The best available measurement of the workability of the AEC
contractor system in the control of labor expenditure is a comparison
of earnings levels in atomic energy employment with levels in comparable industries. Since 1952 the AEC has maintained statistical
series showing gross and straight time average hourly earnings and
average weekly hours of production and related workers employed by
its principal operating contractors. These figures are calculated in the
same fashion as those gathered by the Bureau of Labor statistics in
the United States Department of Labor and are directly comparable.
For purposes of comparison all such earnings figures are subject to the
reservation that the skill "mix" in different industries varies. However, this does not preclude valid comparisons of the rates of change
over time between industries. This kind of comparison shows that
gross hourly earnings of atomic energy contractor employees increased a total of 40.4 per cent for the six and one half year period
from January, 1952 through June, 1958, or an average of 6.2 per cent
per year.3 This is a rate of increase substantially greater than the
average of 4.6 per cent per year in "all manufacturing" industries
during the same period, and somewhat greater than the comparable
annual increases of 5.4 per cent for workers in the "products of
petroleum and coal" industry and the 5.7 per cent figure for the
"industrial inorganic chemicals" industry, as calculated from BLS
figures. 4 The latter two industrial classifications are the standard
comparisons used by the AEC, since they are similar to atomic energy
in process and equipment. So far as the money level of earnings is concerned, the atomic energy earnings level has maintained a position
between the two comparable industries throughout the six and one
half years, although recent atomic energy gross hourly earnings are
about level with those reported for "products of petroleum and coal."5
Although the earnings rates in atomic energy operations have
advanced faster than earnings rates in these comparable industries,
it is not possible, without making a more detailed analysis, to attribute
3. The figure for January, 1952 was $1.93; for June, 1958, $2.71.
4. MONTHLY LABOR REV., earnings and hours statistics for the months given.
5. In May, 1958, AEC contractor earnings stood at $2.70 per hour for a work
week averaging 41.0 hours as compared with $2.72 for petroleum and coal
products with a work week averaging 40.4 hours. Comparison of earnings
levels with more precision might be obtained by using straight time figures,
since the average work weeks and the amount of overtime premium paid
obviously varies between industries. The use of straight time figures, however,
involves conversion of gross-earnings by means of adjustment factors, which
have their own limitations. See Technical Note, Eliminating Premium Overtime From Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing, 70 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 537-40
(1950). In any event the average hours worked in the two comparable industries during the period were very close to the atomic energy averages.
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this to any particular cause. One might suspect that the primary
influence on the rate level has been the increase in employment in
the program and the need to attract competent work forces and hold
them in isolated locations. During the period from January 1952 to
June 1958, atomic energy operations contractor employment has almost doubled while "all manufacturing" employment has decreased
about 4 per cent, "products of petroleum and coal" has declined approximately 10 per cent, and "industrial inorganic chemicals" has
increased about 25 per cent.
Another appropriate measurement of the relative economy of labor
expenditure under AEC cost contracts would be a survey of whether
contractors are employing workers in greater numbers than they
would if governed by normal competitive market considerations.
Since this would involve questions of man-hour productivity, it is
6
an area where AEC security restrictions have inhibited such efforts.
Perhaps of some significance in this connnection is labor turnover.
In this area atomic energy program figures compare favorably with
figures from the industries used for the earnings comparisons. Both
hirings and separations run at rates considerably lower than rates for
"all manufacturing" enterprises and generally are between rates
shown for inorganic chemicals and for the petroleum industry. Quit
rate experience, which provides some indications of the state of
worker satisfaction and the need for training expenditures, has averaged slightly less than one quit per 100 employees per month since
1952. This is considerably better than the 1.7 figure for "all manufacturing," and the 1.2 figure for "inorganic chemicals," but not as low
as the .6 reported for "products of petroleum and coal."
In the second problem area of the government program, that of maintaining continuity of operations free from work stoppages, the AEC has
managed to make use of a variety of emergency devices for a period of
almost ten years to preserve a record of operations free from any prolonged, serious strikes. This performance has been aided by many
talented outside experts on labor-management relations and mediation
techniques, but the greatest contribution has been the government's
success in maintaining a sort of halo (sometimes slightly dented and
askew, but always intact) around vital operations in the program. All
procedures for maintaining continuity have been founded on the
urgency prevailing in AEC operations and have depended heavily
upon assumption by management and labor in the program of a
special sense of responsibility for avoiding harmful disruptions of
operations.
6. Some statistics are available which indicate that production has increased
in some operations while employment has decreased. See Saks, Labor Implications of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 80 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 925-26
(1957).
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The early heritage of labor-management relations in the program
was not one which would seem to presage labor peace. From 1942,
when operations were begun secretly under the Manhattan Engineer
District, until late 1948, there was general suppression of labor
organization. An exception to the rule against union recognition had
been made at Oak Ridge, where two of the three plants were organized
in 1946, and at Los Alamos where maintenance workers' unions were
recognized; but the general opening to union recognition by contractors
did not occur until after the AEC had taken care of the problem of
excluding Communist dominated unions for security reasons from its
operations in Schenectady and Chicago (discussed below). After 1948,
however, organization of manual employees of AEC contractors
proceeded rapidly. At present approximately 30 per cent of all atomic
energy operations contractor employees are represented by unions.
This is slightly less than the percentage of organized employees in
non-agricultural establishments in the nation as a whole-approximately 35 per cent.
There are about 75 different collective bargaining units; 31 are of
the production and maintenance type, 16 are units of guards and the
remainder bargain as crafts. 8 Various metal trades councils, composed
of unions with their origins in the AFL, have been certified as bargaining agent for more employees than any other single bargaining
representative, but the International Association of Machinists would
appear to represent more employees than any other single union,
by virtue of having some large industrial units as well as being a
member of each of the metal trades councils. The Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers of America, with its representation concentrated in
the gaseous diffusion plants, represents almost as many employees.
Like the problems raised by cost type contracts the issue of labormanagement dispute settlement puts the AEC in a permanent administrative predicament. Given the urgency factor and the consequent
need for continuity, contractors have a distinct advantage over unions
in collective negotiations when the unions know that a strike will
not be tolerated. Because of the need to maintain continuity of operations, a special panel for the settlement of labor disputes has been
maintained since 1949. The operations of the panel have caused many
interesting questions of dispute settlement policy to be raised, chief
of which is whether the existence of the panel makes unions reluctant
to settle disputes, since they are able to obtain more by resort to it.
Thus, the AEC, with a responsibility for reviewing the level of labor
expenditure resulting from collective bargaining and with a responsi7. This figure is based on AEC estimates of the numbers in bargaining units
in the program. The figure does not include construction workers. Manual
employees of construction contractors are nearly all organized.
8. 23 AEC SEMIANN. REP. 312 (1958).
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bility for preventing interruptions in continuity of its vital operations,
attempts to deal with these problems in acordance with its avowed
aims of the "least possible governmental interference with the efficient
management expected from the AEC contractors" and "minimum interference with the traditional rights and privileges of American
labor."9
The incompatability of unencumbered collective bargaining and the
government's belief that a strike in an atomic energy plant was
"unthinkable" became a public issue in 1948. In the spri'ng of that
year in a dispute between the operator of the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation and a council
of AFL craft unions, David Lilienthal, then chairman of the AEC,
told union leaders that he would operate the laboratory in the face
of a strike. 0 This dispute, which occasioned the first use of the national
emergency injunction provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, prompted
appointment by the President of a special commission to study the
problems of labor-management relations in atomic energy. Its report
resulted in creation of a special panel to handle labor disputes in vital
AEC operations. This panel (herein referred to as the Davis panel, for
William H. Davis, its chairman) and a successor panel (the Ching
panel, for Cyrus S. Ching, its chairman) appointed in 1953 have
handled critical disputes in the program for more than nine years
pursuant to procedures which emphasize voluntary agreement, and
that failing, formal but non-binding recommendations to the dis-

putants."
This general review of atomic energy labor-management relations
does not permit a detailed analysis of the results achieved by these
panels, but a few statistics will allow some generalizations to be
made about their work. From July 1948, until August 1958, the
records show panel activity in 97 dispute cases, 40 being in construction
9. AEC GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT RELATIVE TO CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS (1955.)
10. PRESIDENT's REPORT, PROCEEDINGS TO THE FORTY-FouRTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE METAL TRADES DEPARTMENT Or THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
LABOR 17 (1953).
11. AEC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LABOR RELATIONS IN
THE ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS (1949). Several detailed studies of the

development and operation of the panels are available. See REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

IN ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS (1957); Mann, The Emergency Is NormalAtomic Energy, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY 166-99 (1955);
Straus, The Development of a Policy for Industrial Peace in Atomic Energy,
WASH. NAT'L PLANNING ASS'N (1950); as well as the reports of the panels,
which contain detailed discussions of their activities. The semiannual reports
of the Davis panel are reproduced as appendices to the seventh through the
thirteenth semiannual reports of the Commission, while the three annual
reports of the Ching panel which are available are reproduced in the annual
reports of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, volumes seven
through nine.
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and 57 involving operations. In 53 of these 97 the panels issued
recommendations to the parties. During this same period it is estimated
that approximately 500 contract negotiations have taken place involving AEC production, research and development, maintenance
and service contractors, and unions representing their employees.
Recommendations issued in disputes involving these non-construction
operations totalled 38 during the nine year period, or about 8 per cent
of the total number of negotiations. Although these figures appear to
undermine'the argument that the existence of the panel results in
union reliance upon it, their significance, as a measurement of the
restraint of the panels in influencing settlements, dims somewhat in
light of the fact that the panel has intervened at almost each contract
renewal in some of the collective bargaining relationships. In fact,
26 of the 38 recommendations in non-construction operations involve
two employers (but who have a total of 11 bargaining units). Aside
from the sometimes stormy collective bargaining relations between
these two contractors and their several unions, labor organizations
and management in the program are not depending upon the panel
to settle a substantial number of disputes.
Intervention of the panel in construction disputes has represented a
special problem. During the period of the Davis panel there was
always some question whether the unions and contractors were
covered by the special procedures. Consequently the panel sometimes
was unable to act effectively to prevent strikes in construction, although its intervention was usually successful in obtaining a resumption of work during a dispute. The Ching panel was handicapped
during its early years, for reasons discussed below, by its inability
to intercede in a dispute before a strike occurred. In many construction
disputes unions are apt to stop work during negotiations since the work
might otherwise be completed while negotations proceed. The 40
interventions in construction disputes in nine years and the 15 issuances of recommendations represent only a very small proportion
of total negotations covering atomic energy construction work.
Although panel proceedings have helped to minimize lost time from
strikes in many construction disputes, the impact of the panels in
this area of the program has been much smaller than in other operations.
There have been differences in the manner of operation of the
panels over the years. In March of 1953 the President accepted the
resignations of the Davis panel members who had served under the
Democratic administration. Subsequently the Ching panel was appointed, which was administratively responsible to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. This panel originally could assume
jurisdiction only in cases certified to it by the AEC as to criticality

1958]

LABOR RELATIONS IN THE ATOMIC PROGRAM

169

and after the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service had given his opinion that "the normal processes of collective
bargaining and mediation and conciliation" had been fully utilized. 12
The tendency of the latter requirement was to force the FMCS to
hold a dispute longer than it might otherwise have done and thereby
to restrict the freedom of the panel. The Davis panel had had greater
flexibility in respect to both the timing of its entrance into disputes
and the means of handling them. It could enter disputes at the request
of either party or of the AEC, after consultation with the FMCS,
and frequently was able to capitalize on its own prestige to mediate
settlement of disputes. For its first three years the more restrictive requirement that disputes be referred by the FMCS left little opportunity
for successful mediation by the Ching panel. Consequently almost
all its intervention resulted in formal recommendations.
These restrictive conditions governing panel interventions had been
imposed by the FMCS when the panel was reconstituted in 1953,
because its officials believed that the existence of an autonomous
panel resulted in avoidance by disputants of normal, voluntary mediation procedures in their efforts to get to the panel. They remained in effect during the first three years of existence of the Ching panel.
Thereafter a change in procedures, made possible by a presidential
memorandum of May 4, 1956, resulted in unleashing the panel. Its
new procedures, issued January 10, 1957, provide that the panel
makes its own decisions on when "the normal processes of collective
bargaiing and mediation and conciliation have been fully utilized
without constructive results."' 3 Like another more famous unleashing,
it has not resulted in any spectacular increase in activity. Indeed there
appear to have been fewer panel interventions since that time than
before.
Although contractors have sometimes attacked the panel as a
dispute settlement device, the greatest overt opposition has come
from the unions. During its early years the panel depended heavily
upon pledges from contractors and unions to maintain the status qua
in any dispute in which it intervened. Following the acceptance of
the resignations of the members of the Davis panel all the major unions.
in the program withdrew their no-strike pledges. In one case sincethat time a union refused panel intervention; in another a union refused to accept its recommendations. Only one contractor has rejected
recommendations of the panel. In that case, which occurred in the
12. White House, Press Release Announcing Establishment of Atomic
Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel, March 24, 1953.
13. Purpose and Procedures of the Atomic Energy Labor-Management Relations Panel, Washington, Jan. 10, 1957. A copy of the May 4, 1956 Presidential
memorandum is attached to this document.
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early days of the Davis panel, the AEC later forced acceptance. 14
Thus, despite some setbacks and handicaps, the panel's effectiveness
has been high.
One measurement of the adequacy of dispute settlement efforts in
the program is the record of time lost from work stoppages. The
table noted' s contains the available statistics showing the percentage
of idle time to scheduled time resulting from work stoppages in the
program from 1947 through 1958. The lower lines present comparable
figures, as compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for all industries,
for manufacturing industries, and for the construction industry.
Percentage of idle time as a result of strikes among non-construction
operations contractors has been small as compared with figures for
all industries, except in 1957. The AEC operations contractor experience looks even more favorable when compared with manufacturing
industries. Percentage of time lost in AEC construction, however, has
been larger than for the United States construction industry.
The success of the Commission's efforts to maintain continuity has
depended largely upon its ability to perpetuate the feeling of program
urgency as the years go by. Some of the feeling of self sacrifice in
the interests of national security was lost in 1953 when the President
accepted resignations of the members of the original panel and the
unions thereupon withdrew their no-strike pledges. Although some
14. Davis, Labor-ManagementRelations in Atomic Energy Affairs, LECTURES

ON AToMIc ENERGY INDUSTRIAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 10

of Mich. 1952).
15. WoRK STOPPAGE EXPERIENCE OF
TRY EXPERIENCE REPORTED BY BLS.

AEC

(Ann Arbor, Univ.
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of the unions and managements in the program have appeared to
prefer to let their disputes follow a normal course without use of
atomic energy dispute settlement procedures, the continued belief
in the need for continuity by the AEC has resulted in three national
emergency proceedings under Taft-Hartley during the past five
years. This represents more than half the total proceedings initiated
by the Eisenhower administration under this section of the law. The
feeling of continued urgency and criticality felt by the AEC was
underlined in 1957 when it rejected the recommendations in a special
report by an advisory committee selected by the Secretary of Labor
to review labor-management relations in atomic energy installations. 16
The report had declared that "the sense of urgency for production of
atomic weapons which was controlling during the crash program
period and the fears of the physical consequences of an interference
with normal operations in atomic energy installations have diminished" and that therefore movement in the direction of normal collective bargaining procedures could be instituted. This contention was
abruptly denied by the AEC and special procedures have been continued unchanged.
Two other problems of a less urgent nature but related to collective
bargaining have some interest in an examination of labor relations
in the program. Both involve relations between the AEC and other
government agencies with responsibilities for administering labor laws.
One involves the Davis-Bacon Act,' 7 the other the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended. The situations encountered in the former
area may be viewed as the counterpart of those disputes in private
industry between management and industrial unions over the issue of
contracting with outsiders for the performance of repair and minor
construction work in the plant. Industrial unions contend that such
work should be performed by the employer's regular force. Building
trades unions, as representatives of employees of construction contractors, advocate performance by contract. In private industry, the
decision as to how to do the work is made by the employer in accordance with his judgment of the ability of his regular employees
to perform, the size and complexity of the job, relative cost, and other
matters, or pursuant to some criteria set up by agreement with the
union in the plant. Under an AEC contract, however, such a decision
may be dictated by the requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, as
interpreted by the Department of Labor. This act requires that on
government contracts for construction, alteration or repair of public
16. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR

MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN ATOMIc ENERGY INSTALLATIONS (1957).

17. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 49 Stat. 1011 (1935), 54 Stat. 339

(1940), 55 Stat. 53 (1941), 40 U.S.C. § 267 (a) (1952).
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buildings, or public works, mechanics and laborers must be paid at
rates prevailing in the area of the work.

All AEC construction performed by contractors is done at the predetermined area rates called for by that act. These are building trades
rates. However, in any production operation there are functions
which would ordinarily be classified as maintenance, or in any event
construction of a very minor nature, which often are covered. A
finding that such work comes under the act is disadvantageous to the
production contractor in several respects. In the first place, it means
that if he intends to use his own employees to perform the work, he
must pay them the building trades scale for the area. This rate is
usually substantially higher than maintenance rates because of the
difference in supplemental compensation such as pensions, insurance,
paid vacations, holidays and sick leave, as well as the difference between regularity of the two types of work. Most employers consider
it to be unwise or impracticable to pay different rates to the same
craft and it would be unfair to reduce the scale of benefits for an
employee during the period he was receiving the construction rate.
This means that if work is decided to be subject of the Davis-Bacon
Act, it must be contracted out. It then becomes necessary to prepare
plans and specifications, invitations to bid and formal contracts. This
may involve what most observers would call wasteful efforts and
also substantial delays in the performance of the work. In July 1957,
the Commission, in commenting on the problems in distinguishing between maintenance and construction, complained that the Secretary
of Labor's rate decisions in such cases amounted to making jurisdictional awards. 18
In some situations compliance with the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, has presented problems for the AEC. One such
case involved the Savannah River Project of the Commission, where
during the height of construction a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor held a week long hearing. Its report,
issued in 195219 found that a preferential hiring system was in operation on the project. Du Pont, the contractor, made the valid defense
that there is no violation of law in this situation absent a finding by
the NLRB. The incident was embarrassing to the AEC nevertheless,
since it demonstrated an incompatability between its policy of maximum delegation of authority to its contractors and the observance
of the intent of the law which ought to be expected of a government
agency.
A related question has arisen under the terms of a cost type con18. 22 AEC SEIANN. REP. 148 (1957).
19. Special Subcomm. on Labor Relations to the Comm. on Education and
Labor, Employment Practices at Savannah River Project, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952).
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tract when the NLRB found that an AEC construction employer was
operating under the terms of a closed shop contract which was discriminatory by its terms.20 Since AEC cost contracts ordinarily provide that the agency will pay the costs of protection against legal
suits, and since the contractor in question did not admit a violation of
the act, the question was at what point ought the AEC to stop providing funds for defense. After the NLRB made the adverse ruling?
In such a case should the AEC have paid the contractor the costs
of making an employee whole for wages lost as a result of discriminatory discharge for union activity? Should the government subsidize
the cost of an appeal to the circuit court? In this case the AEC paid
the contractor for its defense until the NLRB make a finding of violation, then notified him that it would not reimburse an appeal to the
courts.
The needs of security and loyalty have also imposed some troublesome requirements in labor-management relations in the government
program. Some of these consist only of irritating delays occasioned by
the need for investigation and reports on the character, associations
and loyalty of participants in the program. Other security requirements have involved disestablishment of a bargaining agent for
employees of an atomic energy contractor where questions concerning
loyalty of union leaders were unresolved, thereby raising issues involving the abridgment by an administrative agency of the full
freedom or organization otherwise guaranteed by the provisions of the
national labor policy.
Since early in its administration the AEC has maintained that
"neither the security rules nor their administration are matters for
collective bargaining between management and labor."2' - Secrecy
requirements had, of course, contributed heavily to the postponement
of all organized activities among contractor employees during early
Manhattan Engineer District days and in areas outside Oak Ridge and
Los Alamos until late 1948. Even after unions had been allowed to
organize, security regulations were carried over into negotiated
agreements in the form of special security clauses written for the
parties by government officials. These clauses, many of which are
continued in current labor agreements, recognize government authority in matters involving classified information and agree that the
government may require termination of employees for security reasons. Quite generally agreements between unions and atomic energy
contractors exempt security matters from grievance procedures.
The Commission's most significant security action in the area of
20. In re F. H. McGraw and Albert G. Henry, 99 N.L.R.B. 695 (1951).

21. AEC, GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT RELATIVE TO CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS (June, 1955).
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labor-management relations was its expulsion of the United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America from the program in 1948.
One of the chief reasons for delay in opening the program to union
organization had been the doubts of AEC officials concerning the
loyalty of some union leaders who, although not employees subject
to security clearance, exercised the authority of union office over
employees in the program. These doubts were centered on the leaders
of the UE, then representing General Electric employees, including
those in atomic energy operations, in Schenectady, and the United
Public Workers, which had requested recognition as representative of employees at Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago. Late
in 1948 the AEC directed General Electric to withdraw and withhold
recognition if the UE as representative of any workers at AEC owned
or leased installations in the Schenectady area, or any clasified work
performed by the AEC. The University of Chicago was also directed
to refrain from recognizing the UPW at Argonne National Labora22
tory.
These actions were based on two stated reasons: (1) The officers
of neither union had signed the non-Communist affidavits required by
the Taft-Hartley Act; and (2) information was available concerning
alleged Communist affiliation or association of certain officers of the
unions. In view of their administrative, negotiating, or disciplinary
authority over the employees of General Electric and Argonne, the
AEC stated that there was a question whether their continued association with the program was consistent with the security of the
nation and the policy of AEC.23 The UE later filed a bill of complaint
against the AEC and General Electric in a federal district court
asking for an injunction against the Commission action and for
damages. This action was later dismigsed. The Commission order to the
University of Chicago did not result in any legal protest by the union.
In that case the union was not recognized and could not qualify for an
NLRB election because its officers had not filed non-Communist
affidavits.
It is important to recall that the AEC took this action a year before
the CIO expelled the Communist-dominated unions and while they
were still flourishing organizations. Questions were raised at the
time in some quarters concerning whether the UE had received
due process of law, whether there was not danger of application
of similar proceedings by other administrative agencies to unions because their leaders were too militant, and about the implications of
22. 5 AEC SEMIANN. REP. 191-205 (1949).

23. AEC,

REPLY TO SUBCOMM. QUESTIONNAIRE, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE
CO i. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF CERTAIN
UNIONS (1952).
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this as an administrative action apparently unsupported by any
specific provision of law.24 Although the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
contained numerous references to protection of the security of the
program which were pertinent to the exercise of authority undertaken,2 the action was not based on any of these provisions but on the
total or implied authority in the act. Opinion was also expressed that
this action was an unwarranted application of the guilt by association doctrine. 26 Ten years later the best answer to these expressions
of concern are that the-action has not been repeated. At the time,
the AEC answered these criticisms in these ways: (1) The action involved very limited application in that it affected only unions representing employees at government-owned plants or on classified atomic
energy work in a private plant; (2) the union leaders were given an
opportunity to meet with the Commission to explore their objections
to the order-this invitation was not accepted; (3) the courts failed to
sustain the union's legal objections; and (4) the public and the employees affected were given ample authoritive information about the
action and the reasons for it.
The action did unilaterally deprive some General Electric employees of union representation. In 1950, following the expulsion of
the UiE by the CIO, its newly formed affiliate, International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, was certified to represent the same employees following an election in which the UE
was beaten by a ratio of approximately ten to one. It was in this
election proceeding that the NLRB included, at the request of
the AEC, a proviso which has appeared in orders of the Board since
that time applying to employees in atomic energy operations. This
proviso states that any certifications resulting from the election "will
be conditioned upon compliance, by the certified unions, with the
security requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission, a matter
27
exclusively within the jurisdiction of that Commission.
Since the UE case the AEC has issued regulations covering its
security policy in the area of the labor-management relations. 28
In addition to issues involving loyalty of union representatives,
the policy makes provision for security clearance of many non-employee participants in the program, such as union representatives,
NLRB attorneys, field examiners and trial examiners, counsel to the
parties, federal mediators, and arbitrators who may need access to
classified information in the course of their work. These procedures
24. See an editorial in 167 Tn NATION 385-86 (1948). Also comment in 119
NEW REPuBLIc 6, 7 (1948).

25. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 41 U.S.C. § 1801 (1952).
26. Newman, The Atomic Energy Industry: An Experiment in Hybridization,
60 YALE L.J. 1385 (1951).
27. General Electric Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 789 (1950).
28. 16 Fed. Reg. 9679 (1951).
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have served to remove most of the barriers to normal labor-management relations which would otherwise be imposed by security regulations. Although there were some justified criticisms in the earlier days
29
of the program that security had been used as a "shield of immunity"
for contractors to evade their responsibility to bargain with unions, the
inhibitions to normal relationships imposed by security have steadily
decreased until now there is very little restraint other than that imposed by national policy.
SUMMARtY

In summing up the results of some twelve years of labor-management experience in the government portion of the atomic energy
program under the AEC it appears that labor-management relations
under the cost type contract have been reasonably satisfactory from
the standpoint of the government and the taxpayers as well as from
the viewpoint of contractors and their organized employees. Collective
bargaining, subject to the kinds of controls exercised by the AEC, has
not resulted in extravagant working conditions because of cost-plus
conditions and the increases negotiated through the years, as well as
the present level of rates, are not unreasonable when compared to
other industries. It appears that earnings of AEC operations contractors are advancing more rapidly than earnings in comparable industries. But wage differentials are the basic instrument for allocating
labor in our economic system. The present state of atomic energy
calls for expanding employment which in turn requires higher rates to
attract new employees.
The strike record in the operations program has been excellent,
and while time lost as a result of construction stoppages has been
greater than overall statistics for that industry, there has been no
precedent for the magnitude of some of the construction undertaken
by AEC contractors.
Not everyone concerned is satisfied with the dispute settlement
procedures in the program. But it is a healthy sign that criticism has
come from both sides of the bargaining table. Contractor criticism
has stressed the themes that (1) making recommendations in labor
disputes is contrary to the national labor policy in the Taft-Hartley
Act, (2) the procedure encourages disputes, since the unions hope to
get more from the panel than they could without its intervention,
and (3) that unions make extravagant demands in anticipation that
panel recommendations will split the difference. This in turn is said
to make contractors reluctant to make good faith counter-proposals
since these would only sweeten the final panel-imposed settlement.
29. 1949 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 447.
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Criticism on the union side has concentrated on the consequences
of their not being able to strike. In the eyes of some unions this inability to maintain a strong bargaining position, coupled with inadequate panel recommendations, yields frustration.
The leaders among management and union critics have two diametrically opposed solutions of their own, although these are not often
expressed. Management critics of the panel device would prefer no
special dispute settlement machinery, which in effect would allow
strikes in any cases which would not justify use of the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. The union critics would
appear to prefer some form of compulsory arbitration. The former
solution is unrealistic so long as the AEC maintains its policy of avoiding interruptions of operations. The opposite solution, compulsory
arbitration, would be a step backward in hoped for progress toward
normal relationships in the program.
In the security area the experience demonstrates that procedures
can be worked out which will not inhibit union organization despite
elaborate security precautions, and conversely that there is no contradiction between national security requirements and freedom of collective bargaining. Despite the possibility that security may be used
by contractors to avoid collective bargaining obligations, the large
scale organization of workers in the program indicates that this has not
generally occurred.
What are the labor-management problems now present in the
private sector of the industry and what problems can be anticipated
in the future? It seems very unlikely that any substantial labormanagement experience in the government program will be applicable to the developing private nuclear program. The single most
important element in the government program has been the policy
of emphasizing continuity of operations free from strikes. There is no
reason why this should be extended into the private application of
atomic energy. Nor will the special problems engendered by cost
type contracts have any applicability. And as more and more declassification of information relating to civilian uses takes place, the security
restrictions imposed by government regulation will assume less importance.
Some other labor-management issues, which have been relatively
unimportant in the government program, are emerging, however.
These issues generally relate to the problem of radiation hazard. The
unknown nature of this danger to workers in the industry has caused
several unions to undertake exploratory programs and to hire staff
experts to devote time to this problem. Although atomic energy contractors have had an excellent record in protection of employees from
radiation accidents, the unions are concerned lest competitive pres-
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sures among private employers cause them to cut corners in their
safety programs. Unions are also impressed with the fact that exposure
limits have been revised downward in the past year after the AEC
had said for many years that previous limits contained a large safety
factor. The nature of the hazard has implications for workmen's compensation, which is an important issue to unions, and for hazard payments. Although the government program has had little experience
with hazard pay because of the effectiveness of its radiation protection
programs, this can be expected to be a larger issue in collective
bargaining in the private sector of the program.
CONCLUSIONS

The future course of labor-management relations appears to be
dominated by two important influences, at least in the immediate
future. One is the lag in private investment in nuclear power. While
the results of this for the program are inconclusive at present because of disagreement between the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and the Administration on how best to promote nuclear power
development, the trend in Congress appears to be toward providing
stimulation to peaceful applications of nuclear energy by launching
additional government programs. It could be expected that such programs would be carried on under the same kinds of contracts used
in the existing government program. This would mean a continuation
of some kind of government control of labor expenditure and intervention in collective bargaining.
The other important influence is the enduring urgency of the weapons program and consequently of the production of fissionable
materials. This tends to perpetuate the need for special dispute settlement techniques and special security programs, thus putting off the
"return to normalcy," however desirable that may be from the standpoint of good labor-management relations.

